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First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
and The Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle
Adriana Dulic*
I. INTRODUCTION
An arbitral tribunal usually consists of private practitioners engaged in
the business of providing legal services for a fee, often faced with financial
and competitive pressures to earn more money and handle more cases.' Yet,
according to the leading institutional rules, it is within the scope of the arbi-
tral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction (i.e. to decide whether an issue is
arbitrable).2 Who should have such a power - the arbitral tribunal or the
courts? In 1995, the United States Supreme Court in First Options of Chi-
cago, Incorporated v. Kaplan considered whether arbitral tribunals or courts
should have the primary power to decide if parties agreed to arbitrate the
merits of the dispute and whether the court of appeals should accept the dis-
trict court's findings of fact and law or apply a de novo standard of review.3
The Court unanimously held that, unless the parties clearly and unmistakably
provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to
* B.S. University of Nebraska, summa curn laude; J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University.
The author wishes to give special thanks to Gary Born, partner in the London office of W'imer.
Cutler & Pickering, for his guidance in the research underlying this Note, and Professor Roger
Alford for his suggestions.
1. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927):
Arbitrators are not national court judges; they are usually private practitioners, of some
sort, engaged in the business of providing legal services for a fee. Often. they face signifi-
cant financial and competitive pressures to earn more money and handle more cases. That
is true for many arbitrators suitable for international commercial disputes. On the other
hand, it is recognized in many nations that judges and other governmental authorities
ought not have a personal financial interest in the outcome of their official decisions. If
the judge's compensation depended on how he decided an issue, would that be just?
Id. See also Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. Int'l Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568. 573-74 (2d Cir.
1968)(Lumbard, CJ., dissenting)("[Ilt is not likely that arbitrators can be altogether objective in
deciding whether or not they ought to hear the merits. Once they have bitten into the enticing
fruit of controversy, they are not apt to stay the satisfying of their appetite after one bite.")Id.
2. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Rules (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
1976), the ICC Rules of Arbitration (International Chamber of Commerce 1998). LCIA Rules
(London Court of International Arbitration 1998). AAA International Rules (American Arbitration
Association 1997), and ICSID Convention (The International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes 1965).
3. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan. 514 U.S. 938. 942 (1995).
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be decided by the court, not the arbitral tribunal.4 Furthermore, in such a
case, the court of appeals should not accept the district court's findings of
fact, but rather apply de novo standard of review. 5
This note will examine the First Options decision and discuss the effects
of the case on lower court decisions in applying its reasoning.6 Part II will
discuss the background of the "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" principle under Fed-
eral Arbitration Act and various institutional rules.' Part III will provide a
statement of the facts in First Options.8 Part IV will provide an explanation
of the opinion.9 Part V will give a critical analysis of the opinion, examine
the impact the Court's decision had on the lower courts applying the decision
as well as the consequences of the decision and proposing a resolution to the
conflicting interpretations of the opinion.'0 The purpose of this article is not
to argue that the power to determine the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
should rest with the courts rather than with the arbitral tribunal, nor vice
versa. Rather, the purpose of this article is to point out the need for clearer
guidance, as well as provide insight into some of the potential solutions to
these problems.
H. BACKGROUND
A. The Kompetenz-Kompetenzn Principle Under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act
The Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle refers to the allocation of the au-
thority between an arbitral tribunal and a national court over the interpretation
and enforceability of arbitration agreements. The principle, as developed by
German case law and scholarly commentary, authorizes an arbitral tribunal to
determine its own jurisdiction without requesting a judicial decision.
4. Id. at 943.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 11-116 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 11-27 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 49-113 and accompanying text.
11. Note that this comment will utilize the German term "Kompetenz-Kompetenz,"
(meaning literally "jurisdiction concerning jurisdiction") largely for historical purposes, as the
doctrine originated in the German courts. The doctrine refers to the ability of arbitrators to rule
on their own jurisdiction over a party or dispute. See Shirin Philipp, Is Supreme Court Bucking
The Trend? First Options v. Kaplan In Light Of European Reform Initiatives In Arbitration Law,
14 B.U. INT'L LJ. 119. 134-37 (1996).
2
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It presents an extreme version of the regulation of an arbitral tribunal's power to deter-
mine its own jurisdiction. Kompetenz-Kompetenz allows parties to agree. before any dis-
pute arises, to confer upon the arbitral tribunal the exclusive power to determine its own
jurisdiction. Subsequent judicial review is limited to an examination of whether the parties
did indeed create a valid Kompetenz-Kompetenz agreement. Parties may not challenge the
competence decision of the arbitral tribunal in court."
There are two different interpretations of the FAA in regards to the
power to rule on arbitrability1 3 Under the traditional interpretation, "Section 3
of the Act empowers the courts to decide all arbitrability issues."t 4 Section 3
of the Act states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accor-
dance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in de-
fault in proceedings with such arbitration. 5
Prior to First Options the Supreme Court interpreted sections 2 and 3 of
the Act as conferring all issues of arbitrability on the federal court, including
12. Id. at 123.
13. See Natasha Wyss, First Options of Chicago. Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach to
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 72 TuL L Rn'. 351, 356-57 (1997).
14. Id. at 356.
15. Id. (quoting the United States Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000); See
also Philipp, supra note 11, at 149.
The Federal Arbitration Act does not provide parties with a mechanism by which to effi-
ciently and promptly challenge an arbitral tribunal's competence. Perhaps in an indirect
way, Section 3 of the Act might be said to allow an objecting party to challenge the arbi-
trators' jurisdiction immediately. Section 3 provides for a stay of court proceedings, if an
arbitration proceeding has been properly commenced where the court is "satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agree-
ment .... Therefore, a party seeking to resist arbitration on the grounds of lack of arbi-
tral competence, would have to commence separate litigation on the same subject, thereby
invoking the opposing party's defense that arbitration properly governs the dispute. Sec-
tion 3 does not envision a party's direct challenge to jurisdiction before the courts.
Id. at 124 n.24 (citing Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co.. 925 F.2d 1136.
1140-41 (9th Cir. 1991)). In Three Valleys, the court stated, "[B]ecause an 'arbitrator's jurisdic-
tion is rooted in the agreement of the parties,' . . . [a contesting party] . . . cannot be compelled
to arbitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate." Three Valleys, 925
F.2d at 1140-41 (quoting George Day Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. Of Carpenters, Local 354. 722
F 2d 1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984).
3
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the ability to rule on the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement.' 6
Under such interpretation, a court could "examine the arbitration agreement
to determine its validity, thereby allowing the court to announce its opinion
as to the jurisdictional competence of the arbitral tribunal."' 7
The other interpretation (as the dicta contained in First Options sug-
gests), "adoption of the more drastic Kompetenz-Kompetenz as a means of
settling the issue of jurisdictional competence of the arbitral tribunal."' 8
[T]he scope of the court's inquiry is initially limited to the existence of the kompetenz-
kompetenz clause itself... [or rather to] who has the power to rule on arbitrability...
and, if the parties clearly mandate that this issue is arbitrable, then the court has little
choice under section 3 but to stay its proceedings.' 9
B. Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle Under Various Institutional Rules
The leading institutional arbitration rules (the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Model Law, the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Rules of Arbitration, the International Chamber of Com-
merce Rules of Arbitration, the AAA International Rules, the London Court
of International Arbitration Rules, and the International Center for Settlement
of Investment Disputes Rules) all provide that the arbitral tribunal has the
power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including the cases in which the claim
is that the contract containing the clause is not binding or is invalid.20
Article 21 of the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration gives the power to
the arbitral tribunal to determine the validity of the objections to its jurisdic-
tion, including those objections relating to the existence and validity of the
arbitration agreement. 2' Also, under Article 6 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration,
there is a two-stage process for determining the Kompetenz-Kompetenz is-
sue.22 If the validity or existence of an arbitration agreement is challenged,
16. See Wyss, supra note 13, at 356.
17. Philipp, supra note 12, at 123.
18. See id.
19. See Wyss, supra note 13, at 357.
20. See Article 21 of UNCITRAL Rules, Article 15(1) of AAA International Rules, Article
23 of LCIA Rules, Article 6(2) of ICC Rules, and Article 41(1) of ICSID Convention Rules at
http://www.uncitral.org/.
21. See Article 21, Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law stating that "[t]he arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on objections that it
has no jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbi-
tration clause or of the separate arbitration agreement" (available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-
index.htm). These Rules were adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) on April 28, 1976. The General Assembly of the United Nations approved
the Rules unanimously in December, 1976. Id.
22. See Article 6 (2), International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration stating
4
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"any decision as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal shall be taken by
the Arbitral Tribunal itself" once the court is satisfied as to the prima facie
existence of such an agreement.Y This rule has been interpreted to give very
wide discretion to the arbitral tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction. Also,
Article 15(1) of AAA Rules gives the arbitral tribunal an express power to
rule upon an objection as to its jurisdiction. 2 Furthermore, Rule 41(1) of the
ICSID Convention states the arbitral tribunal shall be the judge of its own ju-
risdiction.2 Moreover, Article 23 of LCIA Rules also gives the arbitral tribu-
nal the power to rule on its own jurisdiction.26 In fact, under Article 23(4), by
that
if the Respondent does not file an Answer, as provided by Article 5, or if any party raises
one or more pleas concerning the existence, validity or scope of the arbitration agreement.
the Court may decide, without prejudice to the admissibility or merits of the plea or pleas,
that the arbitration shall proceed if it is prima facie satisfied that an arbitration agreement
under the Rules may exist. In such a case, any decision as to the jurisdiction of the Arbi-
tral Tribunal shall be taken by the Arbitral Tribunal itself. If the Court is not satisfied, the
parties shall be notified that the arbitration cannot proceed. In such a case. any party re-
tains the tight to ask any court having jurisdiction whether or not there is a binding arbi-
tration agreement.
(available at httpJ/www.iccwbo.org/court/nglish/arbitrationrules.asp#a rticle-6.).
23. See id.
24. See Article 15, American Arbitration Association International Arbitration Rules "(1)
The tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with
respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.)"
(available at http:/%Avwsadr.org/rules/international/AAA1750900.htn#Artile 15).
25. See Rule 41(1), The International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID). ICSID was established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States, which was opened to signature on March 18. 1965
(the Convention is known as the ISCID Convention or the Washington Convention). Pursuant to
Article 6(1) of the Convention, the ICSID Arbitration Rules were adopted.
(available at http://www.worldbank.orgicsid/basicdoc/80.htm).
26. See Article 23, London Court of International Arbitration Rules stating that:
23.1 The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including
any objection to the initial or continuing existence, validity or effectiveness of the Arbitra-
tion Agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms or was intended to
form part of another agreement shall be treated as an arbitration agreement independent of
that other agreement. A decision by the Arbitral Tribunal that such other agreement is
non-existent, invalid or ineffective shall not entail ipso jure the non-existence, invalidity
or ineffectiveness of the arbitration clause. . . 23.4 By agreeing to arbitration under these
Rules, the parties shall be treated as having agreed not to apply to any state court or other
judicial authority for any relief regarding the Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdiction or authority.
except with the agreement in writing of all parties to the arbitration or the prior authorisa-
5
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agreeing to arbitration under the LCIA Rules, the parties are agreeing to "not
... apply to any state court or other judicial authority for any relief regarding
the Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdiction or authority, except with the agreement in
writing of all parties .... "27
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
First Options of Chicago, Inc., was a firm that cleared stock trades on
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. 28 Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned
investment company MK Investments, Inc. (MKI) had a trading account with
First Options, and, as a result of the stock market collapse of October 1987,
the Kaplans incurred a substantial trading deficit leaving it in debt to First
Options. 29 In an effort to resolve the debt, the parties entered into a series of
agreements. 30 Kaplan, as the president and sole shareholder of MKI, signed
an agreement containing an arbitration clause on behalf of MKI. 3 1 Kaplan, in
his individual capacity, signed an additional agreement that did not contain an
arbitration clause. The dispute concerned the compliance with the "workout"
agreement, which governed the "working out" of debts to First Options that
MKI and the Kaplans. Upon MKI's loss of additional $1.5 million, First Op-
tions took control of and liquidated certain MKI assets, demanded immediate
payment of the entire MKI debt, and insisted that Kaplans personally pay any
deficiency.32 When its demands were not met, First Options sought arbitra-
tion. 33 MKI accepted arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not personally
signed the document that contained the arbitration clause, denied that the dis-
pute was arbitrable. 34 The arbitral tribunal decided that they had the power to
rule on the merits of the parties' dispute, and did so in favor of First Op-




28. First Options, 514 U.S. at 940.
29. Id.
30. ld. These agreements consisted of the following: "(1) a Letter Agreement executed by
First Options, MKI, Mr. Kaplan, Mrs. Kaplan, and certain other entities and individuals; (2) a
Guaranty executed only by MKI; (3) a Subordinated Loan Agreement executed by First Options,
MKI, and a separate entity; and (4) a Subordinated Promissory Note executed by MKI." Kevin
Michael Flowers, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 12 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL 801,
810 n.7 (1997).
31. Id. at 941.
32. Id. at 940.
33. Id.
34. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
6
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tions.3 The Kaplans asked the Federal District Court to vacate the arbitration
award, while the First Options requested its confirmation. The court con-
firmed the award:
[flinding that Kaplan had "waived" his jurisdictional objections: "[A party who volunta-
rily and unreservedly submits an issue to arbitration cannot later maintain that the arbitra-
tors acted without authority to resolve that issue." Because Kaplan, rather than "consist-
ently maintainfing] an objection to the arbitration panel's jurisdiction" had fded a motion
expressly asking the panel to decide the jurisdictional issue and had "expressed no un-
willingness to abide by the arbitrators' decision," he had thereby "manifest[edj a clear
acceptance of the arbitration panel's authority.""
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's confirmation of
the award finding that the dispute was not arbitrable.-
The Third Circuit found that:
[b]efore "arbitrators" could purport to take jurisdiction over Kaplan personally. it is nec-
essary to show that Kaplan had consented to their exercise of authority. . . . [that]
Kaplan had maintained consistently that he had never personally consented to arbitra-
tion-and therefore, he had not 'waived' or 'surrendered' that defense, . . . [and as such
the] determination that he had consented to arbitration must be made by a court.P
Additionally, the Third Circuit, applying de novo review, determined Kaplan's
jurisdictional defense was in fact well-founded.4 Specifically, "[hie had never
consented, in his individual capacity, to allow the arbitrators to determine the
merits of the dispute."' 41 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
who should have the primary power to decide arbitrability.42
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OPINION
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the court. 43 The Court unani-
mously held the question of whether arbitral tribunals or courts have primary
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 At REy INt'' ARB. 287. 290
(1999).
38. First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
39. See Rau, supra note 37, at 291.
40. 1&
41. Id.
42. First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
43. Id. at 940.
7
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power to decide if parties agreed to arbitrate merits of the dispute depends on
whether parties agreed to arbitrate; the court of appeals should apply de novo
standard of review, with no deference to the arbitral tribunal's decision, un-
less there is a "clear and unmistakable evidence" that the parties intended to
submit the arbitrability issue to arbitral tribunal", and if the parties' intent
that the arbitral tribunal should decide issues of arbitrability is "clear and un-
mistakable", the presumption of court competence on the issue is rebutted
and courts must give considerable leeway to the arbitral tribunal setting aside
its decision only in certain, narrow circumstances. 44 The Court reasoned that
the question whether an arbitral tribunal or courts have the primary power to
decide if parties agreed to arbitrate merits of the dispute depends on whether
parties agreed to arbitrate because the allocation of functions between judges
and arbitrators is based on contract principles.45 In other words,
[A] party who is found to have submitted a dispute to arbitration essentially gives up his
right to have a court independently decide on the merits of the dispute . . . because a
court will only set aside an arbitrator's decision on the merits of a dispute . . . where the
arbitrator exceeded his powers due to corruption, fraud, undue means or in 'manifest dis-
regard' of the law.
46
Furthermore, the Court justified the difference in the allocation of the pre-
sumption as "understandable" because where "the parties have a contract
that provides for arbitration of some issues ... the parties likely gave at least
some thought to the scope of arbitration. ' 47 On the other hand, when the
agreement is silent as to arbitral jurisdiction, the parties may not have even
considered the possibility of arbitration, much less the scope, and forcing
them into arbitration would be unfair.48
V. IMPACT
A. Analysis of Court's Opinion
As pointed out by some critics, the Supreme Court's use of the term
"arbitrability" in First Options seems to include several ideas, and as such
has led to conflicting interpretations and applications of the Court's dicta in
lower courts.49 The term "arbitrability" is generally used to refer to two dif-
44. Id. at 944-49.
45. Id.
46. Flowers, supra note 30, at 804.
47. First Options, 514 U.S. at 945.
48. See id.
49. Conrad K. Harper, The Options in First Options: International Arbitration and Arbitral
Competence, 771 PLbICoMM. 127, 136-37 (1998).
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ferent concepts:
1) [W]hether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute, the two prongs of which are a)
whether the parties are party to the arbitration agreement and b) whether the arbitration
agreement encompasses the dispute at issue; and 2) whether the subject matter of a dis-
pute is amenable to arbitration for public policy reasons.50
Issues relating to the scope of an arbitration agreement, though, are not
within the province of the courts, and the courts usually refer such to the ar-
bitrators.5' The Supreme Court's general reference to "arbitrability" in dicta
leaves the lower courts in its interpretation of dicta with the opportunity to
apply the higher evidentiary burden to all of the arbitrability issues when de-
termining whether the arbitrator or the court should decide the disputed is-
sue.52 Post-First Options cases reveal that:
[B]efore courts even reach the question of who - the court or the arbitrator - decides an
issue of arbitrability, there is conflict among the Circuits as to what constitutes an issue of
arbitrability, and thus conflict as to what is for the court and what is for the arbitrator [to
decide].13
As such, the Supreme Court's imprecise and ambiguous use of the term
means that the lower courts have no clear guidance as to whether a jurisdic-
tional issue should be decided by them rather than by the arbitral tribunal.
B. The Conflicting Interpretations of the First Options Decision
Among the Circuits
An example of the conflicting interpretations of the Supreme Court's
First Options decision is provided by cases concerned with the arbitration
mechanisms of the securities industry. In the securities industry, the rules of
self-regulatory organizations, like the NASD4 and NYSE"5 , impose a limit of
six years after which no customer claim "shall be eligible for submission to





54. The National Association of Securities Dealers Code.
55. The New York Stock Exchange.
56. Rule 10304 of the NASD Code provides: "No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be
eligible for submission to arbitration under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the
occurrence or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim, or controversy. This rule shall not ex-
9
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the "eligibility" of a claim under this provision is a question to be deter-
mined by the courts unless the parties have stipulated otherwise." Other
courts have found that First Options does not require such a result and so the
question whether the claim is time-barred may be left to the arbitrator.58
In the post-First Options decisions, five circuits - the Third, Sixth, Sev-
enth, Tenth, and Eleventh - held that the court must decide the applicability
of the time bar because they found that the bar is a substantive eligibility re-
quirement constituting a jurisdictional prerequisite to arbitration. 59 The Sev-
enth Circuit's decisions in Smith Barney Inc. v. Schell,60 Edward D. Jones &
Co. v. Sorrells,61 and PaineWebber Inc. v. Farnam,62 are typical majority deci-
sions. In these cases, the Seventh Circuit held that the court must decide the
applicability of the time bar based upon:
the language of section 15, [the fact that] NASD itself considers section 15 to be a juris-
dictional bar, [and the finding that] section 35 [of the NASD Code] is not a "clear and
unmistakable" expression of the parties' intent to give the arbitrators the power to decide
whether section 15 bars it from exercising jurisdiction.63
In contrast, five Circuits-the First ... Ninth-held that the arbitral tribu-
tend applicable statutes of limitations, nor shall it apply to any case which is directed to arbitra-
tion by a court of competent jurisdiction" (available at http://www.nasdadr.com/arbcode/
arb_codel.asp#10304). Rule 603 of the NYSE's arbitration rules states: "No dispute, claim or
controversy shall be eligible for submission to arbitration under this Code where six (6) years
shall have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the act or the dispute, claim or
controversy. This section shall not extend applicable statutes of limitations, nor shall it apply to
any case which is directed to arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction." (available at
http://www.nyse.com/regulation/regulation.html). The NASD has proposed a new rule that would
make the organization's Director of Arbitration the sole judge of whether the six-year deadline
has expired ("The proposed rule establishes that all claim are eligible for arbitration unless the
Director decides otherwise, and it removes the courts and the arbitrators from any role in deter-
mining the eligibility of a claim"). See generally Linda Fienberg, NASDR Dispute Resolution:
How to use it to your advantage, SD70 ALI-ABA 177. 192-99 (1999).
57. See infra notes 59-63.
58. See infra notes 54-73.
59. Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, 78 F.3d 474, 478-81 (10th Cir. 1996); See also Merrill
Lynch v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 383-84 (11 th Cir. 1995)(same); PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984
F.2d 1372, 1378 (3d Cir. 1993)(same); Roney and Co. v. Kassab, 981 F2d 894, 898-900 (6th Cir.
1992)(same); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1992)(same);
See also generally Emil Bukhman, 7me Limits on Arbitrability of Securities Industry Disputes
Under the Arbitration Rules of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 143 (1995)
(describing the division among the couhis and the NASD's response and arguing that courts, not
arbitrators, should determine whether section 15 applies).
60. Smith Barney Inc. v. Schell, 53 F.3d 807 (7Th Cir.).
61. Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509 (7"h Cir.).
62. PaineWebber Inc. v. Famam, 870 F.2d 1286 (7" Cir.).
63. Coswell. 78 F.3d at 477.
10
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nal must decide whether the NASD time bar precludes arbitration.' Various
circuits based their decision on a different rationale. The First Circuit found
that the question of time limits is a question for arbitral tribunal because,
while the court acknowledged the principle stated in First Options that the
parties normally intend for the courts alone to decide matters related to arbi-
trability, the first court determined that the time limits would not be consid-
ered an "arbitrability issue" at all as it is not a matter related to arbi-
trability.65 The court stated that "issues other than (I) the existence of an
arbitration agreement between the parties and (2) whether the subject matter
of the underlying dispute is within the scope of the arbitration clause are pre-
sumptively not 'arbitrability' issues." 66 The court concluded by citing Section
35 of the NASD arbitration rules, which allows the arbitral tribunal to inter-
pret the applicability of all provisions under the NASD Arbitration Code as
confirmation of the parties' intent to arbitrate time limits.67
In Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, the Fifth Circuit drew a dis-
tinction between issues of "substantive arbitrability" and "procedural arbi-
trability". 6s In lieu of the Fifth Circuit precedent that timeliness issues are
procedural and must be decided by the arbitrator, the court held that only an
arbitral tribunal can determine whether section 15 applies.69 The Eighth Cir-
cuit based its decision, in FSC Securities Corporation v. Freel, on the finding
that "the parties expressly agreed to have their dispute governed by the
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure.. . [which] means [that] they adopted
the entire NASD Code, including Section 35."70 Therefore, the court held
"that the parties' adoption of this provision is a 'clear and unmistakable' ex-
pression of their intent to leave the question of arbitrability to the arbitra-
tors." 7' Finally, and most recently, the Second Circuit held that the arbitral
64. PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 .3d 589, 598-99 (1st Cir. 1996); See also Smith Barney
Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Prudential Bache Secs.,
Inc., 884 F.2d 128, 132 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990); FSC Sees. Corp. v.
Freel, 14 E3d 1310, 1312 (8th Cir. 1994); Painecebber, Inc. v. Bybyk. 81 F.3d 1193, 1196,
1198-99 (2d Cir. 1996); O'Neel v. National Ass'n of Sees. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804. 807 (9th
Cir. 1982); Conticommodity Services v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1224-26 (2d Cir. 1980).
65. PaineWebber, Inc., 87 F.3d at 599.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 601.
68. Smith Barney Shearson, 47 F3d at 753-54.
69. Ild. at 754.
70. See FSC Secs. Corp., 14 F3d at 1312.
71. Id at 1312-13.
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tribunal must decide the applicability of the time bar without any analysis. 2
However, the court in PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk did find that "the broad ar-
bitration agreement ('any and all controversies which may arise concerning
the account' were to be arbitrated) was clear and unmistakable evidence of
the parties' intent to have the arbitrator determine arbitrability." '"a
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit, which has not decided the question
presented here, appears to accept the "substance v. procedure" approach of
the Fifth Circuit.74 It appears that the Fourth Circuit's analytical approach
wherein the procedural rules of the arbitral forum are incorporated into an ar-
bitration agreement only to govern arbitration procedure, would lead to the
same result with respect to the NASD time bar (which is that the NASD
Code of Arbitration Procedure, including section 15, is for the arbitral tribu-
nal to interpret and apply). 75
C. The Consequences - Uncertainty and Unfairness
a. Uncertainty
One of the consequences of these conflicting interpretations is uncer-
tainty or unpredictability. International commercial arbitration has flourished
in recent decades as the business community has realized the advantages of
choosing arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. Such advantages in-
clude the ability to have an expert as a judge, the ability to enforce arbitra-
tion awards anywhere more readily than foreign judgments so long as the
country is a signatory to the New York Convention, 76 the ability to choose the
neutral or more favorable and less hostile situs than the host country, the
ability to choose the law to be applied in the resolution of the dispute, the
72. See PaineWebber, Inc., 81 F.3d at 1196, 1198-99; See also PaineWebber Inc., 87 F.3d
at 598.
73. See PaineWebber, Inc. 81 F.3d at 1199.
74. See Miller, 884 F.2d at 132 (holding that a clause in a broker-client agreement provid-
ing that "arbitration was to be conducted in accordance with the rules of the arbitration forum
governed only arbitration procedure." The court also held that although the NASD's procedural
rules made the NASD's anti-fraud provisions inapplicable, the NASD arbitrator was not barred
from applying the anti-fraud provisions of other stock exchanges to which Prudential-Bache be-
longed. That result followed from the court's finding that the NASD arbitration rules related only
to arbitration "procedure", and not the "substantive rules that may bear on the merits of the un-
derlying dispute").
75. See id. (holding that the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, including section 15, is
for the arbitral tribunal to interpret and apply).
76. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement Of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (known as the "New York Convention") was adopted 1958 in order to promote and en-
sure the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards.
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ability to bypass the courts and to have a potentially speedier process, etc.'7
There is already evidence of attempts to curtail and bypass this uncertainty by
the business community. The NASD has already proposed a new rule that
would make the organization's Director of arbitration the sole judge of
whether the six-year deadline has expired. The rule resolves the uncertainty
resulting from the conflicting interpretations.7 8 It may be argued that this con-
sequence may be avoided by making sure that there is a "clear and unmistak-
able" evidence that the parties intended to submit the arbitrability issue to the
arbitral tribunal.79 So, what is considered "clear and unmistakable" evidence
of the parties' intent to submit the arbitrability issue to the arbitral tribunal?
In order to determine whether there is a "clear and unmistakable" evi-
dence of the parties' intent to submit the arbitrability issue to the arbitral tri-
bunal, the court must refer to the "ordinary state-law principles that govern
the formation of contracts.: ' 8° If the agreement contains specific language that
refers to, and delegates as to, who should decide the issue of arbitrability,
there is no question that the court will find "clear and unmistakable" evi-
dence of the parties' intent to submit such issue to the arbitral tribunal.8 1 In
Telectronics Pacing Systems, the court held that the language of section 11.02
of the licensing agreement was specific and unambiguous and, as such, con-
stituted "clear and unmistakable" evidence of the parties' intent to submit the
issue of arbitrability to the arbitral tribunal5v Section 11.02 of the licensing
agreement stated that .'[a]ny dispute. . . shall be resolved' by binding arbi-
tration but it provid[ed] for one type of exception and that is when 'the arbi-
trators determine that third party . . . is a necessary party."'13 The language,
thus, "specifically mentions arbitration in connection with determination of
any necessary third party issue... [and as such] offers 'clear and unmistaka-
ble evidence' that the parties agreed to arbitrate whether the condition that
triggers the exception to arbitration applies."' ' Therefore, the court reasoned
that the parties clearly focused on this issue and considered who would de-
77. Robert D. Fisher & Roger S. Haydock. International Commercial Disputes Drafting an
Enforceable Arbitration Agreement, 21 WM. MrrcaEaL L Rav 941. 948.956 (1996).
78. See Fienberg, supra note 56 at 192-99.
79. See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45.
80. See id. at 944.
81. See Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Guidant Corp., 143 F.3d 428 (8 Cir. 1998).
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cide whether the exception applies.85
On the other hand, when the language is so broad as to include "any
dispute arising out of or relating to this agreement," but contains no specific
reference to the issue of arbitrability, the court will most likely find that there
was no "clear and unmistakable" evidence of the parties' intent to submit the
issue of arbitrability to the arbitral tribunal. 86 In Riley Manufacturing, the
court held that the language of the arbitration clause in the manufacturing
agreement did not constitute "clear and unmistakable" evidence of the parties
intent to submit the issue of arbitrability to the arbitral tribunal."7 The court
reasoned that there was no "clear and unmistakable" evidence of such intent
because "although the arbitration clause in the manufacturing agreement is
broadly written, referring to 'any and all disputes arising out of or relating to'
the contract, there was no hint in the text of the clause or elsewhere in the
contract that the parties expressed a specific intent to submit to an arbitrator
the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists .... s However,
when the language of the arbitration clause is just as broad, but it incorpo-
rates institutional rules granting the arbitral tribunal the authority to rule on
its own jurisdiction, 9 the court will find that there is "clear and unmistaka-
ble" evidence of the parties' intent to submit the issue of arbitrability to the
arbitral tribunal. 90 In Amgen, Incorporated v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., the
court held that the language of the arbitration clause in the agreement was
"clear and unmistakable" evidence of the parties' intent to submit the issue
of arbitrability to the arbitral tribunal. 9' The court reasoned that there was
"clear and unmistakable" evidence of such intent because the parties not only
agreed to submit all procedural matters to the arbitral tribunal under this
broad language, but they further agreed to it by accepting the commercial
rules of AAA.92 This is the only logical finding considering that, as stated
earlier,93 the institutional rules mandate that the issue of arbitrability be de-
85. See id.
86. Riley Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d 775 (10' Cir.
1998); See also Scott v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 141 F.3d 1007 (1 1 h Cir. 1998); American Life
Insurance Co. v. Parra, 25 F. Supp. 2d 467 (Del. Dist. Ct. 1998).
87. See Riley Manufacturing Co. Inc., 157 F.3d at 780.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., ICC, AAA.
90. See Harper, supra note 49, at 141-42; see also Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886
F2d 469 (1" Cir. 1989); Societe Generale deSurveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European Manage-
ment and Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863 (1" Cir. 1981); Amgen, Inc. v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 303
Ill. App. 3d 370 (1999).
91. See Amgen, 303 I11. App. 3d at 378.
92. See id. at 378-79.
93. See supra notes 20-27.
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cided by arbitral tribunal. This leads us to another problematic consequence-
unfairness.
b. Unfairness
Unfairness occurs as a result of the use of complex legalistic language,
disparity in sophistication or bargaining power of the parties, or the lack of
opportunity to study the contract and inquire about the contract terms. The
Supreme Court has expressed concern for unfairness by stating that any other
rule would "too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they rea-
sonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide."' The
Court has further stated that the parties to the agreement often may not focus
on the significance of having the arbitral tribunal decide the scope of their
own powers.95 By finding that the broad language used in the standard arbi-
tration clause does not constitute "clear and unmistakable" evidence of the
parties' intent to submit the issue of arbitrability to the arbitral tribunal, the
court manages well this concern for unfairness.9 While the business commu-
nity is likely to be aware of the difference between the use of the broad lan-
guage only, and the use of the broad language coupled with the statement
that the arbitration is being governed by one of the many institutional rules in
the arbitration clause, is it likely that an average person would know such a
difference? Is it more likely that an average person reasonably would have
thought that the judge would decide the scope of the arbitral tribunal's pow-
ers when broad language of the standard arbitration clause is used, yet rea-
sonably would have thought that such would be decided by the arbitral tribu-
nal when the exact same language is used but coupled with the brief
statement that the arbitration is to be governed by one of the institutional
rules? It is doubtful.
c. The solution
One solution to this problem of conflicting interpretations is a modifica-
tion of the American arbitration law (Federal Arbitration Act) by Congress.
Unlike the United States, many foreign and international legislatures have
94. First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan. 514 U.S. at 945.
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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chosen to "spell out" and include the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle in
their statutory law.97 For example, many countries have chosen to adopt Arti-
cle 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The variations in working drafts con-
sidered by UNCITRAL in adoption of Article 16 of UNCITRAL Model
Law:9
indicate a struggle between insufficient and excessive judicial control of the arbitral pro-
cess, in an effort to confer upon the arbitrators substantial authority without damaging the
integrity of the dispute resolution system or the judiciary .. . The first working draft rec-
ognized the arbitral tribunal's power to determine its own jurisdiction by delaying court
review of the arbitral ruling 'until the arbitral award is made, unless [the court] has good
and substantial reasons' to exercise its review earlier . . Comments to the second work-
ing draft indicate a concern that the first draft did not sufficiently emphasize the concur-
rent power of national courts. In the third draft, the writers rejected a proposal allowing a
party to appeal directly to a court, without prior challenge to the arbitral tribunal regard-
ing its jurisdiction. 9
The final draft of Article 16, just like other leading institutional arbitra-
tion rules, grants arbitral tribunals the initial authority to determine the scope
97. See Harper, supra note 49, at 130 (analyzing and comparing different approaches that
various countries have taken as opposed to institutional rules).
98. Article 16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction:
(1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbi-
tration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent
of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is
null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause. (2) A plea
that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the sub-
mission of the statement of defence [sic]. A party is not precluded from raising such a
plea by the fact that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of, an arbitrator.
A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as
soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the ar-
bitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it consid-
ers the delay justified. (3) The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in para-
graph (2) of this article either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If
the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may
request, within thirty days after having received notice of that ruling, the court specified
in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal; while such
a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make
an award.
(available at UNCITRAL's website at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm), Article 16 of The
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration was adopted by the United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law on June 21, 1985. The United Nations has en-
couraged Member States to adopt the Model Law in order to harmonize the laws governing en-
forcement practices and judicial control of arbitral procedure.
99. See Philipp, supra note 12, at 126-27.
16
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol2/iss1/3
[Vol. 2: 77, 2002]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
of their jurisdiction.r0 Therefore, it expressly embraces the principle of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz.
Looking at the individual countries that embrace the principle of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, Swiss Law on Private International Law states: 1. An
arbitral tribunal has the power to consider and make awards on its own juris-
diction; 2. It is immediately appealable; and 3. The arbitral tribunal has dis-
cretion to proceed to hear a dispute on the merits before judicial review.' 0' In
addition, Article 48 of the French Code of Civil Procedure provides that the
courts must decline jurisdiction, even if arbitral proceedings have not yet
commenced, unless the arbitration agreement is manifestly null and void de-
termined before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal." Furthermore, there
are examples of judicial authority reasserting itself using statutory law, in-
cluding a new amendment to the German Arbitration Code establishing judi-
cial authority over the arbitral process. -03 The new amendment (section 1040)
100. See itL
101. See Article 186(1) stating that "[tihe arbitral tribunal shall decide on its own jurisdic-
tion" and Article 186(3) stating that "'[the arbitral tribunal shall, in general, decide on its own
jurisdiction by a preliminary decision." Swiss Private International Law Statute of December 18.
1987 ("Loi federale de droit international prive") (Fr.), translated in Andreas Bucher & Pierre-
Yves Tschanz, INTERNATIONAL ARBrATION IN SWITZERuAND. 225 (1989) ("(1) Le tribunal arbi-
tral statue sur sa propre compdtence; (2) L'exception d'incompltence doit etre soulev& prdalable-
ment a toute defense sur le fond; (3) En gendral, le tribunal arbitral statue sur sa compltence par
une decision incidente." available at http'Jlwww.admin.chlch/f/rsl291/al86.html); See also Article
190(3) stating that "[a]s regards preliminary decisions, setting aside proceedings can only be ini-
tiated on the grounds of the above paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b); the time-limit runs from the com-
munication of the decision." ld. Art. 190(3) translated in Bucher & Tschanz ("En cas de d6ci-
sion incidente, seul le recours pour les motifs predvus au 2c alin6a. lettres a et b. est ouvert: le
ddlai court ds la communication de la d~cision." available at http.//www.admin.chlchif/rsl291/
al90.html). The grounds contained in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) are either an improper jurisdic-
tional decision by the arbitral tribunal or where the arbitral tribunal has been incorrectly chosen.
Id. Thus, the parties need not wait until a final award to challenge the arbitral tribunal's jurisdic-
tional decision.
102. See Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile [N.C.P.C.] art. 1458. § 2 (Fr.) stating that
"Lorsqu'un litige dont un tribunal arbitral est saisi en vertu d'une convention d'arbitrage est
port6 devant une juridiction de 'Etat, celle-ci doit se declarer incompdtente." available at http./I
www.legifiance.gouv.fr/citoyen/code.owlalangue=FR?hcure= 140759314081).
103. See Philipp, supra note 12, at 135-38. (providing information regarding German law
prior to amendment):
In the absence of clear and efficient guidelines in the Code regarding the jurisdictional
powers of the arbitrators and judicial limitations on this power, a solution developed from
the practice of parties and, ultimately, the courts. In a judgment of May 5. 1977. the
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) considered a dispute between parties to a charter agreement
17
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allows the court to review the arbitral tribunal's jurisdictional decision imme-
diately after that decision has been made, so long as the party makes a plea
to the court within a month after receiving written notice of that ruling rather
than upon completion of the arbitral proceedings.104 In addition, the English
Arbitration Act of 1996, though codifing the principle of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, allows direct access to a court for a decision on jurisdiction at
any point during the arbitration upon application of both parties or one party
with the permission of the arbitral tribunal.'10  Under the Arbitration Act of
[(Judgment of May 5, 1977, Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court], 68 BGHZ 356 (F.R.G.)]
... This May 5, 1977 opinion has been interpreted as stating that the contracting parties
may enter, first, into an agreement to arbitrate certain disputes, and second, into an agree-
ment granting the arbitral tribunal the last word on the validity of the original arbitration
agreement as well as the scope of the tribunal's jurisdiction. The opinion appears to indi-
cate that one agreement containing both clauses would suffice, but seems to go even fur-
ther by suggesting that the existence of a Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause means, in and of
itself, that the parties agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration. Because the parties
agreed to give the arbitral tribunal the power to determine its own jurisdiction, court con-
trol over the arbitrator's exercise of power over certain parties or subject matter is ex-
cluded. The courts could only review the validity of the second Kompetenz-Kompetenz
agreement, but not the substantive decision of the arbitral tribunal. Jurisdictional decisions
of the arbitral tribunal are, like all other arbitral awards, subject to set-aside and enforce-
ment proceedings on specific grounds. Under this case law, German law minimizes judi-
cial control of arbitration proceedings.
ld. See also Klaus Peter Berger, Germany Adopts the UNCITRAL Model Law, IN'r'L. A.L.R. 1998.
1(3). 121-26 (1998). (providing a comparison of German law prior to the amendment with the
current state of the law under the new amendment). Under the old German arbitration law, the
parties could authorise [sic] the arbitral tribunal to render a final decision on its own jurisdiction.
In this case, the tribunal was not just empowered to rule on its jurisdiction subject to subsequent
court control. Rather, the German courts qualified this agreement as a separate arbitration clause
in which the parties had agreed that the question of jurisdiction should be dealt with and decided
exclusively by the arbitral tribunal, thus ousting the jurisdiction of the state courts. However,
there has always been strong opposition against this broad view of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The
doctrine was accused of circumventing the mandatory court control of arbitral awards provided
for in the old arbitration law. The new law in section 1040 adopts the solution found in Article
16 of the Model Law. Section 3 of this Article provides for mandatory court control of the arbi-
trators' decision that they have jurisdiction to hear the case. Thus, under the new law, the parties
are no longer authorized [sic] to exclude the competence of the German courts in these cases. Id.
104. See Book 10 on ARB. PRoc. of the CODE OF CIV. PROC. (ZPO), § 1040(3) (Bericht mit
einem Diskussionsentwurf zur Neufassung des Zehten Buchs der ZPO adopted by the Bundestag,
on November 27, 1997, and the Bunderat on December 19, 1997, effective as of January 1,
1998) (Gr.) stating that "Halt das Schiedsgericht sich fur zustandig, so entscheidet es uber cine
Ruge nach Absatz 2 in der Regel dutch Zwischenentscheid. In diesem Fall kann jede Partei in-
nerhalb eines Monats nach schriftlicher Mitteilung des Entscheids eine gerichtliche Entscheidung
beantragen. Wahrend ein solcher Antrag anhangig ist, kann das Schiedsgericht das schiedsrichter-
liche Verfahren fortsetzen und einen Schiedsspruch erlassen." available at http://
www.intemationaladr.corrgermany.htm).
105. See U.K. Arb. Act, 1996, § 30 (Eng.) stating that:
18
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1996, "[a]rbitrators may rule on the extent of their jurisdiction either through
an interim decision or in the final award on the merits... [but] [iln either
case, a court may vary, confirm or set aside the award in whole or in
part" 10 6 Such challenge must be raised directly in a timely fashion or the
party loses its right to raise it later.17 Both the German legislation and the
English Arbitration Act base their jurisdictional provisions on Article 16 of
the UNCITRAL Model Law.It 8
In recent history, many countries have decided to adopt new arbitration
statutes. New arbitration statute reforms can be found in legislation of En-
gland (1979 and 1996), France (1981), Belgium (1985), The Netherlands
(1986), Portugal (1986), Switzerland (1987), Spain (1988), Hong Kong
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own sub-
stantive jurisdiction, that is, as to - (a) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement. (b)
whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and (c) what matters have been submitted to
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement. (2) Any such ruling may be chal-
lenged by any available arbitral process of appeal or review or in accordance with the
provisions of this Part.
(available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts199611996023.htm).
106. See William W. Park, The Interaction of Courts and Arbitrators in England: The
1996 Act as a Model for the United States, IN'tL ALR. 1(2). 54-67. (1998); See also generally
Thomas Carbonneau, A Comment on the 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration Act. 22 Tut. MAR.
L.J. 131. 142-45 (1997).
107. See U.K. Arb. Act, 1996, § 73 (Eng.) stating that:
(1) If a party to arbitral proceedings takes part, or continues to take part, in the proceed-
ings without making, either forthwith or within such time as is allowed by the arbitration
agreement or the tribunal or by any provision of this Part, any objection-(a) that the tribu-
nal lacks substantive jurisdiction, (b) that the proceedings have been improperly con-
ducted, (c) that there has been a failure to comply with the arbitration agreement or with
any provision of this Part, or (d) that there has been any other irregularity affecting the
tribunal or the proceedings, he may not raise that objection later, before the tribunal or
the court, unless he shows that, at the time he took part or continued to take part in the
proceedings, he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the
grounds for the objection. (2) Where the arbitral tribunal rules that it has substantive juris-
diction and a party to arbitral proceedings who could have questioned that ruling-(a) by
any available arbitral process of appeal or review, or (b) by challenging the award, does
not do so, or does not do so within the time allowed by the arbitration agreement or any
provision of this Part, he may not object later to the tribunal's substantive jurisdiction on
any ground which was the subject of that ruling.
(available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl99611996023.htm).
108. See Mahir Jalili, Kompetenz-Kompete" Recent U.S. and U.K. Developments. 13 J.
INT'L ARB. 169 (Dec. 1996); See also Recent Developments in Arbitration Lm" and Practice.
XXI Y.B. Comt ARB. 367 (1996).
19
Dulic: <em>First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan</em> and the Kompete
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2001
(1990), Italy (1994), Germany (1997), as well as in the UNCITRAL Model
Law (19 8 5 ).10 9 If the arbitration statute is clearly inadequate, it needs to be
replaced with a new one."10 In England, for example, an entirely new Arbitra-
tion Act, the Arbitration Act of 1996, was needed because it consolidated ar-
bitration law in a single accessible statute."' "However, in a country with an
established arbitration case law that has long been applied by sophisticated
judges and practitioners, a new statute . . . " may not be needed." 2 The
United States has a unified Federal Arbitration Act' 13 and as such, arbitration
reform may be more productive in the form of an amendment rather than
through adoption of an entirely new arbitration statute, and the allocation of
functions between judges and arbitrators in determining arbitral jurisdiction
may be one of the areas that need to most urgently be addressed." 
4
VI. CONCLUSION
Certainty is crucial to the vitality of the business community. Legal rules
that are easy to ascertain, with predictable consequences, reduce the cost of
business transactions.' 5 Yet, it should never be forgotten that society is made
up of individuals who are not likely to be familiar with the latest develop-
ments in the case law or who are not likely to be able to, or be in a position
to, break down the intricacies and ambiguities of some decisions.
Perhaps it is time for, and the responsibility of, the United States Con-
gress to follow the lead of so many other countries" 6 by reforming their arbi-
tration statutes and updating or amending the FAA, and providing clear gui-
dance for the courts to determine arbitrability. Arbitration under the FAA has
grown to the point where legislative intent can no longer be ascertained. Jus-
tice O'Connor admitted this by saying "over the past decade, the Court has
109. See generally Adam Samuel, Arbitration in Western Europe-A generation of Reform,
7 ARB. INrT'L 319 (1991). For new arbitration statute reform in Germany, see generally Klaus Pe-
ter Berger, Germany Adopts the UNCITRAL Model Law, INT'L A.L.R. 1998. 1(3), 121-26 (1998).
110. See Park, supra note 106, at 65. Hence, the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law
is more appropriate for developing nations that have no legal framework established for the type
of private dispute resolution increasingly common in transnational business. Id.
111. See id. at 65.
112. Id. at 65.
113. See 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
114. See Park, supra note 106 at 65.
115. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish?
Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater
Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757. 779 (1995) ("If the rules are unpredictable, the risks inherent in
a proposed course of conduct cannot be calculated, and potentially beneficial transactions will be
deferred or avoided altogether").
116. See supra note 109.
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abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the
Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own
creation.t"17 Perhaps, it is time for the Supreme Court to revisit this issue and
provide clearer guidance.
In the meantime, in order to protect itself, the business community
should make sure any arbitration is governed by institutional rules. Consum-
ers should keep up to date with the latest developments in the case law, hire
a lawyer, or, at the very least, have the issue of arbitrability on their laundry
list of things to be considered prior to entering into any kind of contract.
117. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson. 513 U.S. 265. 283 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)(citing Perry v. Thomas. 482 U.S. 483. 493 (1987)(Stcvcns. J..
dissenting)).
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